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Governance Model

LMU/COICP Example

Governance Model Example

Define the LMU/COICP governance control system for RC-001: decision authority, role ownership, escalation rules, governance evidence, open governance questions, and pilot-blocking rules.

Cross-Cutting Model LMU Decision Authority

Example purpose

This artifact defines how governance is handled for LMU/COICP.

Governance is treated as an engineering control system. Decisions, risks, exceptions, AI use, release judgments, stewardship actions, and pilot readiness must leave evidence in the repository.

Project

LMU Campus Operations and Incident Coordination Platform

Document control

Field Value
Artifact owner LMU COICP Product Owner
Primary reviewers Architecture Review Board chair, IT security reviewer, AI reviewer, Compliance reviewer, Campus Operations lead, Campus Safety liaison
Status Accepted for internal-review governance
Last updated 2026-07-06
Repository target docs/project-workspace/governance/governance_model.md
Related scope Cross-cutting governance

Governance scope

Area Governed By Evidence Location
Product scope COICP Product Owner and Campus Operations reviewers docs/project-workspace/vision/, docs/project-workspace/requirements/
Architecture and evidence flow Architecture Review Board chair docs/project-workspace/architecture/, docs/project-workspace/design/, docs/project-workspace/governance/evidence_governance.md
Design and implementation Product Engineer with Architecture Review Board docs/project-workspace/design/, docs/project-workspace/implementation/
Testing and verification Product Engineer, IT security reviewer, Architecture Review Board docs/project-workspace/testing/
AI use AI reviewer docs/project-workspace/governance/ai_governance.md
Data and retention Compliance reviewer docs/project-workspace/release/, docs/project-workspace/operations/, docs/project-workspace/governance/
Risks and exceptions Product Owner with accountable reviewer docs/project-workspace/governance/risk_and_exception_governance.md
Release decisions Product Owner with architecture, security, AI, and compliance review docs/project-workspace/governance/release_governance.md
Stewardship Product Owner and assigned area owners docs/project-workspace/governance/stewardship_governance.md

Governance roles

Role LMU Responsibility Decision Authority
COICP Product Owner Owns scope, release posture, stakeholder fit, and next-cycle priority. Can approve internal review scope; cannot override security, AI, compliance, or architecture blockers.
Architecture Review Board Chair Owns evidence behavior, architecture guardrails, and return-to-stage decisions. Can block release on evidence, handoff, or architecture integrity concerns.
IT Security Reviewer Owns reviewer access, access-control testing, and role-matrix maturity. Can block real-user pilot on access-control weakness.
AI Reviewer Owns AI-disabled state, AI-use review, and future AI readiness criteria. Can block AI capability release.
Compliance Reviewer Owns synthetic-data boundary, prohibited data, retention, and cleanup procedure. Can block real or sensitive data use.
Product Engineer Owns implementation quality, defect correction, and verification support. Can recommend technical readiness, but not release approval alone.
Campus Safety Liaison Owns emergency-boundary language and prohibited-use review. Can block pilot if safety boundary is unclear.
Campus Operations Lead Owns operational fit for intake and queue workflows. Can recommend workflow readiness, but not override governance blockers.

Decision rules

  • No pilot expansion without repeating ES-110 Release Readiness.
  • No operational scope expansion without repeating ES-111 Operational Readiness.
  • No deployment expansion without updated ES-112 Deployment evidence.
  • No AI Incident Summary capability without AI governance review, design evidence, testing, release review, operations readiness, deployment checks, and monitoring plan.
  • No real or sensitive data use until data governance, retention, and cleanup procedure are approved.
  • Evidence, access, AI, emergency-boundary, or compliance blockers cannot be overridden by product preference.
  • Stewardship findings must be routed to the correct ETIS stage.

Escalation rules

Trigger Escalates To Required Action
Evidence failure or handoff evidence gap Architecture Review Board and Product Owner Stop affected workflow and route to ES-107 / ES-109.
Access-control failure IT Security Reviewer and Product Owner Stop access, record exception, route to ES-109.
AI Incident Summary appears active AI Reviewer and Product Owner Disable AI, record issue, repeat readiness before AI use.
Real or sensitive data appears Compliance Reviewer and Product Owner Stop review, follow cleanup procedure, record incident.
Emergency-boundary misuse Campus Safety Liaison and Product Owner Stop scenario, revise boundary, retest.
Scope expansion request Product Owner and governance reviewers Return to ES-110 and ES-111.

Governance evidence

Key governance evidence includes:

  • docs/project-workspace/release/release_decision_record.md
  • docs/project-workspace/release/release_conditions.md
  • docs/project-workspace/operations/operational_risk_register.md
  • docs/project-workspace/deployment/deployment_readiness_summary.md
  • docs/project-workspace/monitoring/risk_and_issue_updates.md
  • docs/project-workspace/stewardship/technical_debt_and_improvement_backlog.md
  • docs/project-workspace/stewardship/stewardship_summary.md
  • docs/project-workspace/governance/ai_governance.md
  • docs/project-workspace/governance/evidence_governance.md
  • docs/project-workspace/governance/risk_and_exception_governance.md

Open governance questions

  • Final retention policy for production-like data.
  • Sensitive-data cleanup procedure.
  • Future AI-readiness approval criteria.
  • Minimum evidence-completeness rule for cross-office handoff.
  • Pilot approval criteria after remediation cycle.
  • Emergency-boundary wording standard.

Governance model decision

The LMU/COICP governance model is sufficient for internal engineering review and next-cycle remediation. It is not sufficient to approve operational pilot expansion.

Continue to AI Governance

Govern AI-assisted engineering and keep AI Incident Summary disabled until a future readiness cycle approves it.

Open AI Governance →